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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great cases,
but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because they did
not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them the germ
of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue
of the law."-Mr Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
CONFLICT OF LAws-AVOIDING MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE OF LANDS
SITUATED IN ANOTHER STATE, WHERE THE SALE IS MADE PURSUANT TO A
POWER VESTED IN THE MORTGAGEE-Guels v. Stark.,
Plaintiff's intestate duly mortgaged land to defendant, the mortgage
covering, among other parcels of real estate, one located in Arkansas. The
mortgage was executed and delivered in Missouri, where both of the parties
resided, contained a power of sale, and gave the mortgagee the privilege of
buying the land in at any sale held pursuant to an exercise of the power. The
petition alleged all of the foregoing facts, and, in addition thereto, that after
the intestate's default, defendant sold the Arkansas land and purchased it
in himself at an inadequate figure; that the sale was illegal because made
pursuant to a notice of sale containing an incomplete and misleading descrip-
tion of the property. The petition also asserted that an Arkansas statute re-
quired fourteen days' notice of an intended sale to be given in this type of
1. (1924) 264 S. W. 693.
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mortgage foreclosures. The petition, however, contained no statement con-
cerning other requirements of this statute, nor any other allegations as to
Arkansas law.
Plaintiff prayed for an accounting, and upon payment of the money thus
found to be due to defendant, asked that the latter be required to reconvey to
plaintiff the land which he had purchased at the foreclosure sale. The theory
of plaintiff's case was that defendant was under a duty to exercise his power of
sale legally, and in a manner calculated to bring the best possible price; that
as defendant had not done this, the sale should be regarded as voidable at the
election of plaintiff.2
Defendant demurred to the petition, claiming that it did not state a cause
of action for the reason that it did not plead the Arkansas law. It was urged
that plaintiff's right to avoid the sale depended upon the Arkansas law being
to this effect upon the law in force in the state where the alleged fraudulent
sale took place. It was further claimed that there could be no presumption as
to the Arkansas law, as Arkansas did not have a common law origin. It was
contended that as this was the case, it could not be assumed that the common
law, or English equity (which would have allowed plaintiff to avoid the sale)
was there in force. 3 The demurrer was sustained in the lower court, but this
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, it being held that plaintiff was
not required to plead the Arkansas law; that the petition stated a cause of
action without such allegations.
In reaching this conclusion, our Supreme Court took the position that it
was free to determine plaintiff's rights, regardless of Arkansas law, according
to its own notions of the equities of the case. It was held that, as a result of
the making of the mortgage in Missouri, defendant came under the duties of a
trustee in exercising the power of sale; that these duties he had violated, and
consequently he was liable in an action in personam to make amends for his
breach of trust by reconveying the land to plaintiff. Said the court in this
connection, "The gravamen of the charge in the petition is not dependent upon
any statute, nor a violation of any statute by defendant*** but is in substance
a charge of violation of the duty of defendant in his relation as trustee.*** This
was an injury for which there was a common law remedy. The grounds alleged
are grounds for common law relief, to be pursued in a court of equity. To seek
that remedy in this case, under the facts pleaded in the petition, it was not
necessary to plead the laws of Arkansas, because the cause of action pleaded is
not one created by, nor dependent upon the laws of Arkansas, but upon grounds
actionable under the general principles of equity." 4 It was easy for the court,
proceeding on this basis,5 to find power to compel defendant to convey the
land even though it was situated without its jurisdiction, and the judgment
2. 264 S. W. I.c. 695. souri authorities dealing with this point are fully
3. If defendant's theory of the case was right, collected.
he would seean to be correct in his contention that 4. 264 S. W. 1. c. 697. The italics are the
Arkansas law should have been pleaded; see note, writer's.
Law Series 20, Mo. Bulletin 47, where the Mis- 5. See infra, note 6 and cases cited.
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was accordingly reversed and the case remanded. Is the decision proper?
Should the validity of a sale of foreign land made by a mortgagee, pursuant to
a power given him by the mortgage, executed within the forum's jurisdiction,
be tested by theforum's own law, or by what is necessarily the same thing, by
general principles of equity as understood and administered by theforum?
"In a case of fraud, or trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a court of
chancery is sustainable wherever the person be found, although lands not
within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree."' 6 When a
court of equity has jurisdiction of a defendant, and it has been found that such
defendant is under a specifically enforceable duty to convey to the plaintiff an
interest in foreign land, it can, by virtue of its in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant, order him to make the needed conveyance. Moreover, if the defend-
ant makes a valid conveyance as directed, the grant will be effective at the
situs of the land, and as a matter of federal constitutional law is unimpeach-
able., This power of a court of equity has been sustained ever since the days
of the early English chancellors, and is not open to question at this time. But
when, and upon what principles, is it to be held that a defendant is under a
duty to convey foreign lands? Is it a matter for any forum to decide in any
way and upon any principles that it sees fit?
Whether law be territorial in its jurisdiction or not, most American courts
have usually assumed the position that if an act is legal where committed, it
will be regarded in the same light everywhere else, and an actor cannot be
hailed before anyforum and made liable there by a showing that had he acted,
as he did elsewhere, within the forum's jurisdiction a liability would have
resulted. Surely such an attitude is proper. It would be most unjust to hold a
defendant responsible for an act done in another state, if his conduct there was
legal, within his rights, and subjected him to no liability. Suppose that A in
state 1 injuried B; that A would not have been liable, however, for the injury
according to the laws of 1, because his act was regarded by the law as one of
self-defense. Clearly it would be contrary to justice if B were able to sue A in
state 2 and recover damages for the latter's act, merely because 2's laws differed
in this respect from those of 1.8 The orthodox formulation of this proposition
is that 2's law is territorial; that that law had no jurisdiction over the alleged
6. Marshall, C. J., in Massie v. Watts (1810) Brunley v. Stevenson (1873) 24 Ohio St. 474;
6 Cranch (U. S.) 148, 160. See also accord Olney v. McCune v. Goodwillie, supra note 6, 204 Mo. I. c.
Eaton (1877) 66 Mo. 563; McCune v. Goodwillie 336; Barber, Equitable Decrees, 17 Mich. Law
(1907) 204 Mo. 305, 102 S. W. 997 (di tum); Rev. 527.
Cooley v. Scarlett (1865) 38 11. 3 16; Paget v. Ede 8. "The defendant having done no wrongful
(1874) L. R. 18 Eq. 118; 4 Pomeroy, Equity act in this commonwealth, and the injury for
(4th ed.) sec. 1318. But see State ex rel. v. Grimm which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
(1912) 243 Mo. 667, 148 S. W. 868. having taken place in New Hampshire, and not
7. Fallv. Eastin (1909) 215 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. being the subject of an action or indictment by
65, while not standing squarely for this proposi- the laws of that state, this action cannot be main-
tion, clearly intimates that a deed executed tained." Le Forest v. Tolman (1875) 117 Mass.
pursuant to the forum's decree would he effective 109, 110. See also Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L. R.
to pass the title it purported to pass. See also 60. B. 1.
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assault in 1, and could for.this reason, neither impose a duty upon A, nor create
a right in favor of B. Scholars today (and perhaps rightly so) might hesitate
to state the principle in this way. They might insist (absent constitutional
requirements) that a court in state 2 could impose a liability upon A,9 but at
the same time they would at least agree that a judgment to this effect by 2's
courts would be bad policy; that the matter was no concern of 2's courts save
to refuse to hold A to any liability contrary to that enjoined by the law of 1.9- '
Assuming that all that defendant did in the instant case was to act in
Arkansas, it is difficult to see, in the light of the foregoing discussion, how
plaintiff stated a complete cause of action in his petition without alleging that
defendant's exercise of the power of sale resulted in an obligation under Arkan-
sas law to reconvey. If that law did not require defendant to reconvey the
land, he was free to keep it, and to be unmolested in this respect at anyforum.
It was incumbent therefore upon plaintiff to show to the court that the duty
existed by virtue of provisions in the foreign law to this effect. To hold that
defendant was bound to make a reconveyance upon general principles of equi-
ty, regardless of whether or not such principles were in force in Arkansas, is to
say in substance that Missouri's law was in force in Arkansas, and to cause
its laws to affect a transaction occurring beyond its domain.1t This is an un-
warrantable interference with Arkansas' affairs-an attempt to govern tran-
sactions taking place there, and is contrary to recognized principles of conflict
of laws. It is proper, therefore, at this time to inquire whether all that happen-
ed in the transaction complained of was action by defendant in Arkansas? If
this did constitute the sole cause of complaint, it is believed that the decision
overruling the demurrer cannot be sustained, and is unfortunate. It may be
9. "My conclusion is, that while, so long as we
have the territorial organization of modern
political society, the law of a given state or coun-
try can be enforced only within its territorial
limits, this does not mean that the law of that
state or country cannot, except in certain ex-
ceptional cases, affect legal relations of persons
outside its limits." Cook, Bases of Conflict of
Laws, 33 Yale Law Journal 457, 485. See also
note by the same learned author in 28 id 67.
Professor Cook there suggests that a court may
attribute any legal consequences that it sees fit
to any state of facts occuring entirely without its
domain. Doubtless Professor Cook would not,
however, regard such action by a court as de-
sirable if the transaction did not affect domestic
matters.
9a. In Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230,
52 L. Ed. 1039, plaintiff made a contract with
defendant in Mississippi, which was illegal by
that law. In some way or other, in spite of the
illegality, plaintiff had the matter submitted to
arbitration and gained an award. The award,
however, would have been unenforceable in
Mississippi. Plaintiff sued upon the award in
Missouri, and recovered judgment. Plaintiff
then sued upon the Missouri judgment in Mis-
sissippi. The federal supreme court held that the
judgment should have been given full faith and
credit. This decision permitted the Missouri
court to override the Mississippi law, and seems
unfortunate. There was a strong dissent by the
late Chief Justice, concurred in by three other
justices. Holmes, J., who wrote the prevailing
opinion, conceded that the case was a hard one
but concluded that courts will not often make
mistakes of this kind and apply the wrong law to
the facts, 210 U. S. I. c. 237. It appears therefore
that even though the Missouri court did have the
power to overrule the Mississippi law, that good
policy should have prevented its so doing. "No
court would give judgment for a plaintiff unless
it believed that the facts were a cause of action
by the law determining their effect." per Holmes,
J., 210 U. S. I. c. 237.
10. See supra note 8.
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answered that probably no injustice in this particular case was done, because
it is safe to assume that the sale was voidable under Arkansas' law of fiducia-
ries. That may well be the case, and if that is so, the court unwittingly reached
the right result. But it is to be noted that our Supreme Court proceeded on no
such theory as this; it was not interested in the law of the State of Arkansas.
It decided the case and determined the extent of defendant's duty on general
principles of equity, and distinctly asserted that Arkansas law had no bearing
whatever on defendant's liabilities and obligations."
Defendant acquired his power in Missouri (pursuant to Arkansas' laws of
conveyancing) by plaintiff's intestate there delivering the mortgage deed to
him. What defendant actually obtained under this deed would seem to have
been an incorporeal interest in Arkansas land, which he was to use in that
state by taking action there. The law regards a power of sale, when given to
secure the payment of a mortgage debt, as indestructable,12 holding that when
it is exercised, title to the land affected passes. It would therefore appear that
the right of the donee-mortgagee, to the extent that is exists, is analogous to a
right in land-to an estate or interest in land. This power is, within its limited
sphere of operation, in its nature substantially identical with a title. This is so
because the mortgagee may, at any time after default, regardless of the mort-
gagor's wishes or action, dispose of the property, for purposes of secutiry, as if
he owned it, and pass a title on. The position of the defendant therefore, as
owner of the power, can be said to be entirely comparable with the position of
an owner of a fee to land in Arkansas,"3 and his exercise of the power can be said
to have been an act in Arkansas by which he availed himself of the benefits of a
title there located, just as the holder of a fee acts at the situs of the land when
he disposes of the same.
What an owner of a fee to land may do with the land so owned depends
altogether upon what the law of the situs allows." If that which is done is
legal according to that law, it should be legal everywhere. His liability must
be measured by that law. It follows easily enough from this that if defendaht
had, as a result of his power, title to land in Arkansas, whether or not he was
liable for the act of exercising his power, as plaintiff claimed he was before the
Missouri courts, depended upon Arkansas law creating such a liability. What
defendant could do with this power was for Arkansas law to say. Accordingly,
it is suggested that, under the above analysis of the transaction, it was improp-
er for the Supreme Court to impose a duty upon defendant to reconvey upon
any general equitable principles not shown to have been in force in Arkansas.
11. 264S. W. I. c. 697. learned author intimates that such a right might
12. Mechem, Agency (2nd ed.) secs. 570 and be classified as an interest in the property, but
655. expresses some doubt.
13. That such powers are an interest in the 14. United States v. Crosbey (1812) 7 Cranch
property seems to be recognized by Professor (U. S.) 115, 3 L. Ed. 287; Sells P. Miller (1860) 11
Mechem, op cit. sec. 570; see also Terry, Principles Ohio St. 331.
of Anglo-American Law, sec. 127 t seq. The
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Perhaps the analysis of the transaction complained of, contained in the
two preceding paragraphs, is not correct. Possibly when plaintiff's intestate
gave defendant a power of sale, defendant, by implication, assumed certain
executory obligations with respect to its exercise. These obligations might
have been governed by the law of Missouri, but not, however, by any general
equitable principles unincorporated in the law of any particular jurisdiction.
If this should happen to be so, there is authority which would sanction the
Missouri court's compelling defendant to reconvey to plaintiff, even though
Arkansas law, under similar conditions, would not have imposed a like duty.
Suppose that A in state 1 makes an agreement with B, in consideration
of money to him loaned by B, to give B a mortgage upon land situated in state
2; that such an agreement, according to the law of 1, is specifically enforceable,
but that it is not binding by the law of 2. It has been held on substantially
this state of facts that l's court could compel A to give the mortgage if it is
legally possible to give such form of security in 2.11 It has also been held, upon
practically similar facts, that such a decree should be made in 2 by 2's own
courts.' 6 The reasoning back of these decisions is that a contract affecting land
in another jurisdiction, if legal where made according to the law there existing,
is legal everywhere and should be enforced everywhere if only the contract can
be carried out at the situs, and is not contrary to the policy of the situs. It is
said that the mere fact that the law of the situs does not afford a similar lia-
bility, under similar circumstances, does not indicate a positive policy against
the existence of such a right; that there is nothing immoral in the transaction,
and that it is important that foreign made contracts should be held binding
even though they affect land at the situs in a way that such a contract, if made
there would not have affected the land.
It might be possible to hold that when defendant's intestate obtained
this power, he took it by agreement in trust, according to the law of Missouri,
to the extent at least of exercising it in such a way as to bring to the mortgagor
from the sale as much money as possible. It might also be said that defendant
was under the further obligation, if he bought the mortgaged land in himself
under conditions unfavorable to the mortgagor, to hold the title so acquired
in trust for the mortgagor. Perhaps in addition to merely taking a power of
sale, defendant did by implication assume these trust duties. If this is the
proper construction to place upon the transaction, the Missouri court, upon
the authority heretofore cited, would have been free to hold defendant to the
duty of reconveying, applying its own law, because it was the proper law of the
contract; because Missouri law was the law which had jurisdiction of the trans-
action whereby defendant took his power, assuming these trust duties.
15. Ex parse Pollard (1840) Mont. & C. 239, not be enforced there. This decision is under-
Lorenzen, Cas. Conf. of Laws, (2nd ed.) 116. standable. Such an agreement might well be
16. Poison v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211, considered contrary to the established policy of
45 N. E. 737. But there i's authority contra, it the forum. An exhaustive note is to be found in
being held that a contract affecting land, which L. R. A. 1916-A 1044.
would have been invalid if made at the situs, will
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The accuracy of the above construction seems doubtful to the writer. Did
defendant, by virtue of an implied trust agreement, assume any duties, when
he acquired the power? It is believed that he did not. The donee of a power
does not assume any duties with respect to the exercise of the power. Whatever
duties he may be under are imposed upon him as a matter of law. If the power
is fairly exercised, well and good; if it is not so exercised, equity steps in and, in
the absence of a bona fide purchase, imposes certain equitable burdens
upon the donee, or upon the party purchasing at the sale with notice. The
burdens are not agreed upon; they are burdens which the law implies and im-
poses, just as the law implies a promise to pay for unjust enrichment. For
these reasons it is urged that defendant was bound only according to Arkansas
law. All that happened in Missouri was that he obtained a power. This was
an interest in Arkansas. What could be done with that interest depended upon
the burdens Arkansas law imposed upon defendant, and upon no other law.
J. L. PARKS.
UNILATERAL CONTRACTS-REVOCATION OF ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF GooDs.
Malloy v. Egyptian Tie & Timber Co.'
Defendant wrote plaintiff requesting delivery of all the oak ties that
plaintiff might cut and deliver until further notice, promising to pay for the
same as supplied and inspected. Pursuant to this order, plaintiff cut and de-
livered a quantity of ties such as ordered, but defendant refused to receive or
pay for the same. This action was brought for such refusal. Plaintiff had
judgment in the circuit court, and the Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, holding that upon the delivery of the ties, defendant was con-
tractually bound to pay as promised., The actual decision is to the effect that
when plaintiff performed the requested act, he afforded consideration to sup-
port defendant's promise and by so doing converted it into a binding and en-
forceable bargain.
The result of the case is clearly just,2- but it is believed that the learned
1. (1923) 212 Mo. App. 429, 247 S. W. 469.
2. 212 Mo. App. 1. c. 432.
2a. Roberts v. Harmount etc. Co. (1924) 264
S. W. 448; Reynolds v. Walsh etc. Co. (1921) 227
S. W. 438; Royal etc. Co. v. U. S. etc. Co. (1920)
205 Mo. App. 616,226 S. W. 656; White Oak etc. v.
Squire (1920) 219 S. W. 693; Riddle v. Castner
(1919) 202 Mo. App. 584, 209 S. W. 127; Warren
P. Ray etc. Co. (1918) 200 Mo. App. 442, 207 S. W.
883; Barnesv. Bragg (1917) 198 S. W. 73; Wallace
V. Workman (1915) 187 Mo. App. 113, 173 S. W.
35; Hirsch etc. Co. v. Paragould etc. Co. (1910)
148 Mo. App. 173, 127 S. W. 623; Rozier v. St.
Louis etc. Co. (1910) 147 Mo. App. 290, 126 S. W.
532; Nicholson v. Acme etc. Co. (1909) 145 Mo.
App. 523, 122 S. W. 773; Campbell o. American
etc. Co. (1906) 117 Mo. App. 19, 94 S. W. 815;
Jones v. Durgin (1885) 16 Mo. App. 370; Schlitz
Co. v. Missouri etc. Co. (1921) 229 S. W. 813;
Halloway v. Mountain etc. Co. (1921) 228 S. W.
451; Hudson v. Browning (1915) 264 Mo. 58, 174
S. W. 393; Underwood etc. Co. v. Century etc. Co.
(1909) 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400 (same case 118
Mo. App. 197, 94 S. W. 787); Quigley v. King
(1904) 182 Mo. 196,168 S. W. 285; Laclede etc. Co.
v. Tudoretc. Co. (1902) 169 Mo. 137,69 S. W. 384;
Blaine v. Knapp (1897) 140 Mo. 241, 41 S. W.
787; Glover v. Henderson (1895) 120 Mo. 367, 25
S. W. 175; Lewis v. Mutual etc. Co. (1876) 61
Mo. 538; Lindell v. Rokes (1875) 60 Mo. 251;
Offord v. Davits (1862) 12 Com. B. (N. S.) 748.
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court's analysis of the transaction is not altogether accurate, and is likely to
cause confusion. In the course of its opinion, the court said in substance that
defendant's order, before being filled by plaintiff was a "nude unilateral agree-
ment", lacking in mutuality, binding neither party, but that plaintiff's delivery
of the ties remedied this defect and imposed upon the former the duty of carry-
ing out his original promise.3 The characterization of defendant's order as a
contract of any kind appears to be unfortunate and is misleading. The order
was not intended as a contract of any kind, and could not have been one. It
Was a mere offer; as such it was valid, and if accepted according to its terms
(as it was) it then ripenedfor thefirst time into a valid and binding agreement.
If A promise to pay B $100 for a stipulated act, he has made no contract
with B unilateral or otherwise; he has only extended an offer to B, which the
latter is privileged to either accept or reject. Moreover, before B accepts, or at
least commences to perform his act of acceptance, 4 A is free to withdraw his
proposal. It is elementary in the law of simple contracts that an unaccepted
offer is only a step in negotiations, which may possibly culminate in a contract
through its being accepted, but until such offer is accepted, or possibly per-
formance of the act of acceptance is begun, neither the offeror nor the offeree
is contractually bound.6
Suppose, however, that in the assumed case B does the requested act, A
not having revoked his offer; in this event B has accepted A's offer, and a
unilateral contract results. It is unilateral, as distinguished from bilateral,
because when the offer is accepted, B has done all that A has demanded of
him, and all that remains of the transaction is A's promissory obligation to pay
for the completed act. 6 It is to be noted also that consideration appears at
this point in the transaction for the first time. This fact, however, is natural
enough. An offeror is always furnished with the consideration, which makes his
promise binding, through the acceptance of his offer by the offeree.6 In fact
the very purpose of an offer is to secure for the offeror his consideration, or
acceptance. The offer is the means by which the offeror acquires his considera-
3. 212 Mo. App.!. c. 433.
4. As to whether or not commencement of
performance of acceptance makes an offer irre-
vocable, see infra note 15 and text in connection
therewith.
5. Payne v. Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep. 148;
Boston etc. Co. v. Bartlett (1849) 3 Cush. (Mass.)
224; see also Lapsley e. Howard (1894) 119 Mo.
489, 24 S. W. 1020; Sooy v. Winter (1894) 188 Mo.
App. 150, 175 S. W. 132. Williston, Contracts,
sec. 55.
6. ". . . where a man requests another to
perform services for him, and the latter does so,
the request is an offer of a promise to pay for the
services, and performance of the services is an
acceptance of the offer-one of the parties in the
formation of the contract does all that he can be
required to do and there remains an outstanding
obligation on the other side only. The contract
is unilateral." Lamm, J., in Underwood etc. Co.
v. Century etc. Co. (1909) 220 Mo. 522, 527, 119
S. W. 400. See also Williston, op. cit. sec. 65.
6a. "The request is an offer of a promise to
pay for the services, and performance of the
services is an acceptance of the offer. This is des-
cribed as consideration executed upon request",
Underwood etc. Co. v. Century etc. Co., supra,
note 6, 220 Mo. I. c. 527. "The requirement,
usually stated for the sufficiency of consideration
to support a promise, is in substance a detriment
incurred by the promisee, or a benefit received by
the promisor at the request of the promisor; Wil-
liston, op. cit. sec. 102.
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tion. In order, therefore, to find that a transaction has culminated in a con-
tract, we do not need to demand the 1resence of the element of consideration
until the offer has been accepted. For these reasons, it is believed that the
court made an incorrect analysis of the facts in the instant case.7 There was
no void unilateral contract when defendant gave its order to plaintiff; defend-
ant merely made a proposition to plaintiff. Plaintiff did not, by delivering the
ties to defendant, validate a contract, which until such time had been lacking
in mutuality and void. By this delivery he accepted an outstanding offer,
and a contract then, and only then, arose.'
In the instant case defendant did not attempt to withdraw his offer until
after plaintiff had actually delivered some ties. To the extent of such delivery,
therefore, there was a contract, and defendant was rightly held bound. 9 Sup-
pose, however, that A asks B to build him a coach, and promises to pay B $500
for the coach when delivered; that it is clear from the terms of the offer that A
is asking for B's act and not for a promise to deliver the coach; if B spends his
time and money preparing the coach for delivery, can A withdraw his offer
before the coach is completed and delivered, but after B has changed his
position as assumed? Some cases hold that A is privileged so to do upon the
broad proposition that an offer does not bind the offeror, but is revocable at
any time before its acceptance. It is said that inasmuch as B has not accepted
until the coach has been completed and delivered, A acts within his legal rights
in recalling his offer.- Such a deoision is obviously hard on B, and should be
avoided if possible. It is most unjust to leave B with an unfinished coach on
his hands, with no duty resting on A to at least compensate B for the expense
that he has been put to as a result of relying on A's offer. Most courts have
7. That such a faulty analysis is calculated to
cause confasion is demonstrated by the dis-
senting opinion of Woodson, J., in Underwood
etc. Co. v. Century etc. Co., supra, note 6. I n
discussing the validity of an offer, such as de-
fendants' in the case under review, the learned
judge said in substance (220 Mo. I. c. 535) that
a promise to pay for an act cannot become bind-
ing by the promisee's performance of such act.
because the act "could not change the agreement
into a bilateral contract" nor could it "perform
the two fold office of furnishing a consideration
for the contract, and at the same time constitute
an agreement to accept" (id 536).
8. "There are two modes of making simple
contracts .... .The one is, when one party
promises to do a certain thing and in considera-
tion of that promise the other party engages to do
something on his part. Then as nothing is done
but the making of the promises, it is absolutely
necessary that mutual, valid promises, amounting
to an express contract, should appear; otherwise
one of the parties might claim the benefit of the
promise of the other. without in return doing any
act or being liable for any loss whatever ....
The other mode is, when one party promises in
consideration that the other will or will not do
some act. Then no mutual promise need be set
forth or exist; but it is necessary and sufficient
to show the act done. It is not requisite that it
should appear the plaintiff might have been sued
for not doing the act; for he may recover after
the thing done, though it was at his election
whether he would do it or not up to the moment of
its execution." Ruffin, C. J., in Gurvin v. Cromar.
tie, 11 Ired (N. C.) 174, 179 (1850); cited in
Costigan, Cas. Contracts, 43.
9. See cases cited supra note 2a; Great
Northern Co. v. Without (1783) L. R. 9 Coin.
Pleas 16.
10. Williston op. cit. sec. 60. Professor Willis-
ton advocates this view saying that "any other
result involves either a violation of recognized
principles of contracts (i. e. that all offers are
revocable) or the invention of new ones."
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realized this element of injustice in such a rule and have endeavored in one
way or another to reach a different conclusion.
The problem has been before the Missouri courts on two occasions, and in
each case the offeror has been held to his offer, and the offeree allowed to re-
cover as if the contract were bilateral., In fact the court intimates in one case
that the contract becomes bilateral-as if the parties had exchanged promises
in the first instance, upon the offeree's commencing to perform his acceptance.1 2
A holding of this kind, where the offeree is suing, reaches a desirable result.
But suppose the case was that the offeree refuses to continue in his acceptance,
and the offeror insists upon his full performance; if the contract is truly bilater-
al, the offeror could hold the offeree to such a duty, for in every bilateral con-
tract both parties thereto are bound to perform their respective promises. 1"
It is believed, however, that an offeree in a case like that assumed should be
free to stop performance at any time. It is to be noted that the offer does not
ask the offeree for a promise to perform. It asks for an act, and the offeror
promises to pay for the act if it is done. This would seem to indicate that the
offeree is to have the privilege of performing or not as he sees fit. For these
reasons cases which hold that the contract becomes bilateral, when the offeree
commences to perform the acceptance seem unsound, and to improperly
construe the transaction, and the offer.1
4
It has been suggested that every offer which looks to the formation of a
bilateral contract contains a collateral offer whereby the offeror binds himself
to keep the main offer open upon corqdition that the offeree will commence to
perform his acceptance within a reasonable time, and continue the same to
completion.15 This construction is reasonable, and reaches the proper end. The
main offer upon the offeree's commencing to perform becomes irrevocable
(as in cases of options), and protects the offeree from an improper withdrawal
of the offer. It also protects the offeror, because the obligation is to keep the
offer open only so long as the offeree proceeds with his act of acceptance in a
reasonable and proper way. At the same time the offeree is free to stop per-
formance at any time, just as an optionee is free to accept or reject the offer
which is the subject matter of the option, if he so desires. Interpreting the
arrangement in this way seems to construe the transaction as the parties
actually intended. The offeree as a reasonable man must have expected that
he would have a chance to accept the offer. On the other hand, the offeror
could not have expected that the offeree would be bound to perform, because
he did not stipulate for a promise. He expressly stipulated against such an
obligation and only asked for an act. J. W. M.
11. Jones v. Durgin (1885) 16 Mo. 370; 15. McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 Hary.
American etc. Co. v. Walker (1901) 87 Mo. Apo. L. Rev. 644. See also, Ballantine, Acceptance of
503. - Offers, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 94. Professor Ballantine
12. American etc. Co. v. Walker, supra, note has collected cases from other jurisdictions which
11. hold an offer to be irrevocable after the offeree
13. See supra note 8. has commenced acceptance.
14. See Williston op. cit. sec. 60.
